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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, Frank Fernandez was convicted under the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act for his involvement with the Mexican 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
436 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:435 
 
Mafia.1  The “Eme” was known as the biggest gang in the Los Angeles area, and 
its participants were imprisoned for conspiracy to aid and abet in drug 
trafficking within the Los Angeles County jail and for the conspiracies to 
murder four individuals.2  Eme’s involvement throughout the prisons allowed 
the gang to expand, and this expansion allowed Eme to threaten members of 
smaller gangs.3  Eme’s violent actions resulted in crimes that the RICO Act was 
specifically designed to prevent.  This law, designed to restrict organized crime, 
may soon be used to uncover corrupt practices in the United States’ electoral 
process. 
In 1970, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was 
passed.  This statute, under Title 18 of the United States Code, was enacted to 
control the infiltration of organized crime within corporate businesses.  Its 
original function was to prosecute the business practices of criminal cartels.  
Modern racketeering law is now applicable to more business practices than just 
those run by criminal organizations.  Over the past forty years, the Supreme 
Court has developed a broad reading of the statute that is widely accepted.  The 
inclusive nature of racketeering law can now be used to find corruption within 
seemingly fair businesses and organizations.  Under the recent holding of 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in January 2010, the RICO Act 
may even be applied to show corruption in the election process of our own 
government.  In Citizens United, the Court held that the statute banning 
independent corporate expenditures to political campaigns was a ban on First 
Amendment speech and was unconstitutional.4   
In the aftermath of the Citizens United case, corporate donations to political 
campaigns will continue to change drastically.  Big corporate spenders will be 
able to endorse the candidate with the policies that best serve their business; 
these endorsements come in increments of thousands, or maybe even millions of 
dollars.  Politicians will start constructing campaign platforms to attract the 
biggest and wealthiest corporations.  Because studies in the past have shown that 
wealthier candidates have a better chance of winning elections,5 these donations 
might change election outcomes.  These changes will take away the validity of 
our election process because candidates will be more focused on gaining the 
most contributions rather than constructing a platform that gains voter approval. 
Section II will explore the general rules of corporate campaign donations 
before the holding of Citizens United.  This has been a controversial issue in the 
                                                          
* J.D. expected May 2012, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law.  I would like to thank all the current members of the Cleveland State Law Review 
for their hard work in publishing this issue.  A tremendous amount of gratitude is also 
owed to my parents, David and MaryAnn Henzler for their constant love, support, and 
encouragement. 
 
1
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 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010). 
 
5
 Brad Alexander, Good Money and Bad Money: Do Funding Sources Affect 
Electoral Outcomes, 58 POL. RES. Q., no. 2, 353-58 (2005). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss3/9
2011] POLITICAL GANGSTERS 437 
 
courts that started in the early 1970s with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971.  The Supreme Court had multiple inconsistent holdings on the subject that 
led up to the current Citizens United decision.  
Section III of this article will summarize the Citizens United case.  While 
this case had multiple holdings, the Court’s main holding on the categorization 
of independent corporate political donations as political speech may completely 
alter the election process.  In coming to this conclusion, it was necessary for the 
Supreme Court to overturn multiple cases, which had previously been used to 
set the standard for political donations.  While the Court’s reasoning for 
unlimited corporate expenditures based upon the First Amendment was 
compelling, the ultimate holding still contains flaws. 
Section IV will illustrate the immediate effects the Citizens United case had 
in the year following its decision.  The November 2010 midterm elections were 
the first chance that corporations could exercise their new-found expanded First 
Amendment rights.  The figures show that spending immediately increased.  The 
further increase of political corporate spending may potentially change the 
dynamic of our election system and lead to corruption. 
Section V will introduce the RICO Act and the foundation of racketeering 
law.  A brief history of this law will illustrate how much it has deviated from its 
original purpose and how its expanded broad view can be used to cover many 
actions other than bad business practices and organized criminal cartels.      
Section VI will define the action of racketeering, which is found in Title 18 
U.S.C. § 1951.  Racketeering can be broken down into two essential elements, 
which can be further defined by case law.  Previous court holdings can be used 
to show what types of specific actions can be considered racketeering.  In 
exploring how a person in a position of power can affect these elements, the 
definitions will foreshadow the possible effects of political candidates having 
the ability to obtain large independent corporate expenditures.   
Section VII will explain how the act of racketeering fits within the RICO 
Act, which is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1962.  This act, intentionally written to be 
overbroad,6 originated to control the infiltration of organized crime in 
businesses.  A long list of crimes other than the explicit criminal elements that 
make up racketeering under § 1951 can constitute the “racketeering activity” 
that is the basis of this statute.    
Section VIII will show how racketeering law can be applied to the holding of 
the Citizens United case.  The application of this law will illustrate the possible 
ill effects of the Citizens United rule on our election process that might remove 
the integrity from the voting process and take the ultimate power of election 
away from the voters. 
Section IX will discuss the dissenting opinion of the Citizens United 
decision.  The four dissenting judges state that the majority’s decision was 
misguided and offer other potential arguments the majority could have made 
that would not have caused such sweeping changes in the law.  This reasoning 
can be used by future Supreme Courts if the Citizens United ruling is ever 
overturned. 
                                                          
 
6
 Ann K. Wooster, Validity, Construction, and Application of Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 171 A.L.R. FED. 1, 14 (2001). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
438 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:435 
 
Section X will discuss some potential measures that Congress can take in 
preventing the corruption created by Citizens United.  The only thing that can 
completely remove this corruption is a future Supreme Court case overruling 
Citizens United.  Until then, Congress can create legislation that implements 
some regulations and restrictions to protect election integrity. 
II.  CORPORATE CONTRIBUTION REGULATIONS BEFORE CITIZENS UNITED 
Restrictions upon corporate spending in furtherance of political elections 
began as early as 1907.  The first statute explicitly making corporate donations 
illegal was the Tillman Act of 1907.7  It banned “any corporation whatever” 
from making “a money contribution in connection with” federal elections.8  
There were two main motives behind the Tillman Act: first, to combat “the 
enormous power corporations had come to wield in federal elections, with the 
accompanying threat of both actual corruption and a public perception of 
corruption; and second, [to] respect the interest of shareholders and members in 
preventing the use of their money to support candidates they opposed.”9   The 
most recent regulations on corporate expenditures were written into the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971.  Title 18 § 441b explicitly prohibited 
corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with any 
election to any political office.  The text of the statute states that it is “unlawful 
for any [. . .] corporation [. . .] to make a contribution or expenditure in 
connection with any political office.”10  This section of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act was ultimately found to be unconstitutional by the majority in the 
Citizens United case.   
A.  Buckley v. Valeo 
The constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act was first 
questioned in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo. 11 The main argument was that the 
Federal Election Campaign Act interfered with the First Amendment.12  The 
Court stressed that the First Amendment not only protects political speech and 
political expression, but also covers the constitutional right of association.13  The 
appellee’s main argument was that the Federal Election Campaign Act regulated 
the specific conduct of making donations, not the political expression or 
association protected by the First Amendment.14 
                                                          
 
7
 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).  See FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 508-10 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
8
 Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 509 (citing Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 
864-65 (1907)). 
 
9
 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
10
 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2010). 
 
11
 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 
12
 Id. at 14. 
 
13
 Id. at 15.  See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).   
 
14
 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15. 
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The appellate court agreed with the appellee’s argument, and based its 
reasoning largely upon that of United States v. O’Brien.15  The appellate court in 
Buckley distinguished the facts at hand from O’Brien, when it stated that this 
was not a case “where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct 
arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the 
conduct is itself thought to be harmful.”16  The Supreme Court agreed with the 
appellate court, by stating that the intent of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
was to equalize “the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by 
placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and 
groups.”17  The Court further stated that contributions are only one way of 
communication; corporations are not wholly prevented from political expression 
under the Federal Election Campaign Act because donations in smaller 
denominations are allowed, and other forms of communication are still open and 
valid.18  The Supreme Court ultimately held that the limits on corporate 
contributions by the Federal Election Campaign Act were constitutional, despite 
the arguments against these regulations.19 
B.  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
The court revisited the issue of corporate contributions again in 1978 when 
deciding First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 20 In this case, the 
constitutionality of a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited banks and 
corporations from making contributions was questioned.  The conceptual 
questions asked about this state statute were similar to those asked in Buckley, 
but here the Court’s decision was in direct opposition with that found in 
Buckley. 
The Massachusetts statute in question banned corporations from making 
contributions “for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any 
question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the 
property, business or assets of the corporation.”21  This Court again turned to the 
question based upon the extension of First Amendment rights to corporations 
                                                          
 
15
 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding the prohibition on burning 
a selective service registration certificate constitutional, as such conduct was not 
protected political speech under the First Amendment). 
 
16
 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382). 
 
17
 Id. at 17.  The court also held that additional governmental issues include the 
prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption, and to open the political system 
more widely to candidates with smaller amounts of funding.  Id. at 25-26. 
 
18
 Id. at 21. 
 
19
 Id. at 79. 
 
20
 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 
21
 Id. at 767-68 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).  The 
Court ultimately broke down the statute into two distinct regulations: the prohibition of 
corporate spending to influence ballot questions not materially affecting its business 
interests, and a per se illegality standard for corporate spending to influence a question of 
individual taxation.  Id. at 772.    
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making political donations.22  This Court ultimately held that if these speakers 
were not corporations, but rather citizens using donations as political expression, 
the donations would not be regulable under the First Amendment.23  This 
reasoning changes the question from whether corporations have First 
Amendment rights, to a question asking if the corporate identity of the speaker 
deprives them of these rights.24  This question has been answered in the past, but 
the answers have been fact-specific.  The Supreme Court has already held that 
corporate speech to educate and inform the public25 or to increase the flow of 
commercial information26 are both protected under the First Amendment.  The 
Court stated that, in order to be consistent with these two prior holdings, the 
First Amendment should protect corporate speech in the form of political 
donations that can be considered political expression, even though the speaker 
has a corporate identity.27  The clause in the Massachusetts statute that limits 
corporate speech on subjects that “materially affect” the corporation is 
inconsistent with the First Amendment rights, as this sort of restriction was 
never intended when the First Amendment was created.28 
The Court then addressed the “prevention of corruption” reasoning discussed 
in Buckley.  It did not dispute that this reasoning is important in keeping our 
electoral system fair, and that the “preservation of the individual citizen’s 
confidence in government is equally important.”29  It ultimately found that 
“there ha[d] been no showing that the relative voice of corporations ha[d] been 
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts or 
that there ha[d] been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in 
government.”30 
C.  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
The holding from Bellotti on corporate political donations was the precedent 
until 1990 when the Court decided Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. 31 
Here, a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds 
to make independent expenditures in connection with elections for state office 
was challenged.32  The statute in question did not completely prevent 
corporations from making political donations—it only required them to make 
                                                          
 
22
 Id. at 771. 
 
23
 Id. at 777. 
 
24
 Id. at 778. 
 
25
 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).  
 
26
 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 764 (1976). 
 
27
 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 
 
28
 Id. 
 
29
 Id. at 789 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)). 
 
30
 Id. at 766. 
 
31
 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 
32
 Id. at 655. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss3/9
2011] POLITICAL GANGSTERS 441 
 
the donations from a fund separate from their corporate treasury.  The Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce argued that making donations from a segregated 
corporate fund, rather than its treasury fund, “burden[ed] the Chamber’s 
exercise of expression.”33  While considering this burden, the Court used a 
balancing test, and decided that the need to prevent “corruption or the 
appearance of corruption” outweighed the burden caused by having a segregated 
fund.34  This case was the active applied precedent until Citizens United was 
decided in January 2010.  
D.  McConnell v. FEC 
One last case that is important to consider in the standards before the holding 
of Citizens United is McConnell v. FEC. 35 This case specifically addressed the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which amended the Federal Election 
Campaign Act.  This amendment put further restrictions on contributions to 
candidates and money spent on communications that are intended to influence 
election outcomes.36 
The Court once again considered the arguments originally made in Buckley 
and stated the importance of preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption within the election system, and ultimately affirmed that holding.37  
More importantly, the Court addressed the definition of a new term introduced 
in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: “electioneering communication.”38  
The Court held the definition of “electioneering communication” to be 
constitutional because it is both “easily understood and objectively 
determinable.”39  While it agreed that the statute was a restriction on speech, the 
Court stated that the plaintiffs did not make a sufficient argument showing that 
this restriction created a significant burden on “First Amendment expression” or 
a constitutionality argument based upon over-breadth.40  The Court ultimately 
held that the definition of electioneering communication was “wholly consistent 
with First Amendment principles as applied to the media.”41 
                                                          
 
33
 Id. at 658.  See also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).   
 
34
 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.  See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985). 
 
35
 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 
36
 Id. at 94. 
 
37
 Id. at 95. 
 
38
 Id. at 102.  The definition of this term is especially important in the evolution of 
campaign donation restrictions preceding the holding of Citizens United because the 
conduct at issue in that case was considered “electioneering communication” under the 
statutory definition.  “Electioneering communication” is defined as any “broadcast, cable, 
or satellite communication” that clearly identifies a candidate for federal office within 
sixty days of a general election and thirty days of a primary.  2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).  
 
39
 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 103. 
 
40
 Id. at 105. 
 
41
 Id. 
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III.  CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation that released a movie entitled 
Hillary: The Movie in January 2008.42  They wanted to increase distribution by 
offering it through video-on-demand via digital cable.43  Citizens United was 
prepared to pay $1.2 million to make this movie and three separate 
advertisements for it to be available on video-on-demand.44  Afraid that these 
actions would violate 2 U.S.C. § 441b (part of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act), Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federal 
Election Commission.45  This statute prohibits corporations from making 
independent expenditures to elections for political office.46  Subsection (b)(2) of 
this statute would specifically bar Citizens United from making the film by 
preventing “electioneering communication,” which is defined as “any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate 
for Federal office.”47  In its original suit, Citizens United argued that 2 U.S.C. § 
441b was unconstitutional as applied to the Hillary movie.  The district court 
granted the Federal Election Commission’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that § 441b was facially constitutional under McConnell,48 and that it 
was constitutional as applied to the Hillary movie because its only interpretation 
was that Senator Clinton was unfit for office.49 
In addition to the holding in McConnell, Citizens United’s arguments were 
also at odds with the holdings of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.50  
In that case, the Court held that the application of a state statute similar to 441b 
was constitutional.51  The Court here stated that the statute in question prevented 
potential corruption by independent corporate donations.52  Between these two 
holdings, the federal 441b seemed to be facially constitutional.   
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered that the holdings of McConnell 
and Austin were binding upon the district court—this gave the district court little 
power in deciding the Citizens United case because lower courts do not have the 
                                                          
 
42
 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010). 
 
43
 Id. 
 
44
 Id. 
 
45
 Id. at 888. 
 
46
 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2010). 
 
47
 § 441b(b)(2). 
 
48
 This court held that the statutory definition of “electioneering communications” 
was constitutionally valid.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 105 (2003). 
 
49
 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. 
 
50
 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 
51
 Id. at 659. 
 
52
 Id. 
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power to overrule Supreme Court decisions.53  This led the Supreme Court to 
reconsider the previous holding of Austin and the facial validity of 441b.54 
In considering the facial validity of 441b, the Court stated that “[s]ection 
441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy 
corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates 
or broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary 
election and 60 days of a general election.”55  Thus, this statute could be read as 
an outright ban on corporate political speech.56  The Court further held that 
speech by corporations cannot be restricted just because of the speaker’s 
corporate identity; it stated that “First Amendment protection extends to 
corporations.”57  In essence, the Court held that restricting independent 
corporate expenditures is against the First Amendment because it restricts 
political expression. 
The Court then considered the previous holding in Austin, which held that 
restricting independent political donations was constitutional in order to prevent 
corruption.58  The main argument the Austin court made was that this political 
speech needed to be limited to prevent “antidistortion interest.”59  The Court 
intended to prevent “the corrosive and distorting effect of immense aggregations 
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.”60  This decision left the Court with an inconsistent precedent—the statute 
on its face is unconstitutional, but previous decisions state that the application of 
these statutes is constitutional.  After considering the anti-distortion interest 
argument made in Austin, the Court rejected it because “it would permit [the] 
Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association 
that has taken on the corporate form.”61  
Before explicitly overturning Austin, the Court considered the government’s 
argument that banning corporate political speech would prevent corruption.62  
The holding in Buckley supported this argument.63  The Buckley court limited 
corporate donations in state elections in order to prevent improper commitments 
from candidates.64  The Court in Citizens United rejected this argument on the 
                                                          
 
53
 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893. 
 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 Id. at 897. 
 
56
 Id. 
 
57
 Id. at 899. 
 
58
 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 
59
 See id. 
 
60
 Id. 
 
61
 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
 
62
 Id. at 908. 
 
63
 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). 
 
64
 Id. at 47. 
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grounds that twenty-six states do not restrict expenditures for non-profit 
corporations, and that “[t]he Government [did] not claim that these expenditures 
. . . corrupted the political process in those States."65  Citizens United was also 
distinguished from Buckley, because Buckley was dealing with quid pro quo 
contributions from corporations.66  The problem of corruption is one that the 
Court leaves to Congress to solve; it stated: 
If elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent 
expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put 
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern.  
We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either 
the appearance or reality of these influences.67    
In order to keep up with rapidly changing technology by allowing corporations 
to exercise their First Amendment rights in the election process, the Court 
explicitly overturned the holding in Austin that banned independent corporate 
expenditures to political candidates.68  Thus, the holding of the district court that 
stated 441b was constitutional was reversed.69 
IV.  THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE CITIZENS UNITED DECISION 
Changes to the way campaigns are run and financed took place almost 
immediately and can be seen through an investigation of the November 2010 
midterm elections.  It was clear as soon as the decision was final that spending 
would change drastically.  Michael Toner, a campaign finance lawyer and 
former Federal Election Commission chairman stated that “[w]e might be on 
track for the most expensive cycles ever, even more than ’08, which is really 
hard to believe.”70  It was also clear that not everyone thought the increased 
spending would be a good idea.  Representative Chris Van Hollen from 
Maryland stated “[t]his has got to be a wakeup call to every citizen that they 
cannot allow the big corporations to call the shots on these elections.”71  New 
York City Public Advocate Bill de Blasio developed an analysis of the political 
spending that took place during the election.72  He found that “[s]pending 
                                                          
 
65
 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908-909. 
 
66
 Id. at 909. 
 
67
 Id. at 911. 
 
68
 Id. at 912-13. 
 
69
 Id. at 917. 
 
70
 Jim Kuhnhenn, Election Spending Sets Records: No Recession Here, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2010/12/10/anonymous_donors_spent_132
m_on_2010_campaign_ads./. 
 
71
 Deborah Tedford, Supreme Court Rips Up Campaign Finance Laws, NPR.ORG, 
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?Id=122805666. 
 
72
 Beth Fouhy, Anonymous Donors Spent $132M on 2010 Campaign Ads, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.wtop.com/?nid=213&sid=2070829. 
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allowed by Citizens United accounted for $85 million in all 2010 Senate 
races.”73 
Not only have corporations decided to spend more under the new Citizens 
United rule, they have started “funneling their money to trade associations such 
as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or other groups that can air election ads, 
often without having to disclose their donors.”74  Public advocate de Blasio’s 
analysis also made startling findings on anonymous donations—as of October 
2010, “$80 million [had] already been spent by groups with undisclosed donors 
this election cycle—nearly five times more than in 2006.”75  This sort of 
spending shields a corporation’s interests—the shareholders and consumers 
have no idea what causes their funds are supporting.  Craig Holman, a 
government lobbyist, stated:  
The decision to invest corporate funds in an election is almost always 
solely that of the company CEO . . . .  In publicly held companies, the 
CEO is under no obligation to get the consent of, or even inform, 
shareholders of how she or he is spending their money on politics.  
This is a new Wild West of unlimited and undisclosed corporate 
spending in our elections.76   
David Arkush, the director of Public Citizen’s Congress Watch division 
observed that “[t]he overwhelming majority of the corporate money flowing into 
the 2010 elections remains hidden from public view, laundered through scores 
of outside electioneering groups that are refusing to disclose their funding 
sources.”77  In an effort to combat corruption, public advocate de Blasio 
convinced Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan Chase to keep their 
money out of 2010 elections; “[w]ith billions in their general funds, any of them 
would have been able to substantially tip the scales of virtually any 
congressional or Senate race with the equivalent of pocket change.”78   
These harmful effects that began immediately after the Court’s ruling in 
Citizens United may worsen in the future and may include potential racketeering 
actions by political candidates. 
                                                          
 
73
 Id. 
 
74
 Kuhnhenn, supra note 70. 
 
75
 Daniel Stone, Coming Clean, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www. 
newsweek.com/2010/10/13/when-corporate-strategy-meets-election-spending.html 
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V.  RACKETEERING LAW: A HISTORY 
In 1970, Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act to remedy the 
long-standing problem of legislating organized crime.79  Part of this was the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 1961, which deals with racketeering activity.80  The most important 
element of § 1961 is the requirement of a pattern of activity, as many crimes 
other than actual racketeering can constitute a pattern of racketeering under this 
statute.81   The elements of the crime of racketeering itself are defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 1951.  This statute reads: 
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce 
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or 
threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance 
of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or 
both.82  
In order to constitute racketeering activity, the elements of both § 1951 and § 
1961 must be met.  
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964 addresses a civil remedy for treble damages under the 
RICO Act.83  This clause was overlooked by many after the initial passing of the 
RICO Act, but then caused a flood of litigation by unlikely parties in the early 
1980s.84  These cases involved private plaintiffs against defendant businesses, 
rather than against organized crime rings.85  
The RICO act was redefined in 1985 by the holding of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrex, Co., Inc.86  The plaintiff here brought a long list of charges against the 
defendant, one of which was a RICO claim under § 1964 for civil treble 
damages; the plaintiff alleged a pattern of mail fraud.87  The district court barred 
this claim for two reasons: first, because the defendant’s actions had not 
previously been held in the trial court as mail fraud, and second, the plaintiff 
was not alleging any specific “racketeering injury.”88  The Supreme Court 
reversed this decision and remanded the case so the RICO claim could be 
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heard.89  The Court held that just because criminal acts were making up the civil 
RICO claim does not mean the criminal burden of proof must apply, so there 
was no need to have a previous criminal conviction on the alleged charge.90  If 
the wire fraud could be proved by a preponderance of evidence standard, the 
RICO claim would stand.91  The Court also stated that the plaintiff was not 
required to allege any certain type of injury.92  Once the plaintiff alleges each 
element of the RICO Act, the injury that follows from the commission of these 
acts is the only injury that must be shown.93  This case set a low burden of proof 
for a private plaintiff alleging a RICO claim.         
The validity and purpose of the RICO act was questioned in 1993 in Reves v. 
Ernst & Young.94  Here, the Court stressed the importance of the “liberal 
construction” clause.  Following 18 U.S.C. § 1961, there is a note that states 
“provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.”95  The Reves court stated that “[t]his clause obviously seeks to ensure 
that Congress’ intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the statute, 
but it is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never 
intended.”96  The Court held that the statute needs to be read in a flexible way to 
ensure that it covers all actions that Congress intended to protect against, but not 
more than that. 
The holdings of these two cases show how the application of the RICO act 
has changed over time to include more types of cases and protect more against 
more types of crimes.  The expansion of the law allows the elements of RICO to 
be defined broadly and applicable to the new plan of unlimited independent 
corporate expenditures allowed under the holding of Citizens United. 
VI.  THE ELEMENTS OF RACKETEERING 
Like any criminal statute, the racketeering statute can be broken down to 
specific essential elements that must be present to constitute the crime.  Two 
main elements must be present to form a racketeering action.  First, the actor 
must obstruct, delay, or affect commerce.97  And second, the actor must do this 
through robbery or extortion.98  Some of these elements are explicitly defined 
within the statute, but these elements can be further explored through case law. 
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A.  The Obstruction, Delay, or Affect on Commerce 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1951 defines the term commerce to mean: 
commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or 
Possession of the United states; all commerce between any point in a 
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point 
outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State 
through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over 
which the United States has jurisdiction.99  
This definition of commerce set forth in the actual statute is fairly inclusive.  
Case law can be used to show the standard that must be met to prove what 
constitutes an obstruction, delay, or affect upon this commerce.  An obvious 
obstruction or effect on commerce would be a restriction upon the sale of goods 
or the transport of goods, but the courts in the past have required less action than 
that.  Most circuits have held that a “de minimus” effect was a proper standard 
to constitute a violation,100 but in United States v. Jarabek, the court held that the 
government only needed to show a “realistic probability that an extortionate 
transaction [would] have some effect on interstate commerce”101.  An actual 
effect or obstruction of commerce need not be present, the affects just need to be 
foreseeable for the actor to have violated § 1951.  The court reasoned that “the 
requisite interstate commerce nexus could be established if the jury found that, 
unless the victim gave in to extortionate demands, the victim’s business might 
have been hindered or destroyed.”102  Another court made a finding of affected 
commerce based upon the depletion of corporate funds.  In United States v. 
Gates, the court held that the “extortion of money from an interstate business, 
thus depleting its funds” sufficed to show an effect upon interstate commerce.103  
The indirect effects of having less money to run the business would have had a 
long term effect upon the overall commerce involved in its operation. 
B.  Extortionate Conduct 
For a complete violation of § 1951, there must also be an element of 
extortion.  The statute defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, 
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”104  The definition included in 
the statute explicitly states that there are two separate ways extortion can 
happen: first through threatened force, violence or fear, and second under color 
of official right.   
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When analyzing extortion through the first method, one court considered 
fear of economic harm.  In United States v. Sturman, the court held that “[f]ear 
of economic harm is an acceptable form of fear under section 1951.”105  The 
term “under color of official right” means those acting in a position of authority, 
such as a public office.  These two forms of extortion are mutually exclusive—
the government does not have to show force, violence, or fear when proving 
extortion through color of official right.  The court in United States v. Williams 
stated that “to date, eight circuits have directly held that [§ 1951] violations 
based on extortion by a public official need not include proof of threat, fear or 
duress.”106  This court further stated that the definition of “under color of official 
right” is “consonant with the common law definition of extortion, which could 
be committed only by a public official taking a fee under color of his office, 
with no proof of threat, force or duress required.”107  Another court held that the 
mere acceptance of payment could constitute the extortion element under § 
1951.  In United States v. Butler, the court held that “it is the position of the 
United States that such conduct, whether the solicitation of, or the mere 
acceptance of, illicit payments for the desired ‘official action’, was a clear abuse 
. . . falling within the proscriptions of the Act.”108  Even if the actor is not 
soliciting payment, the acceptance of a payment for an act performed within his 
official capacity constitutes extortion.  Extortion under color of official right can 
also be applied even if the actor is not currently holding public office while 
engaging in the illegal conduct.  The court in United States v. Salvitti held that 
“to prove extortion the government need not prove that the defendant actually 
possessed the power to carry out his threats; it needs to prove only that the 
victims reasonably believed that he had such power.”109  Under this ruling, if the 
victim reasonably believes that the actor could gain access to public office, his 
actions to gain payment could be considered extortionate.  One court also 
applied § 1951 to candidates for public office.  In United States v. Meyers the 
court held that if the candidates enter into a conspiracy to obtain property at a 
time before the election, and the conspiracy ends after the actors become public 
officials, § 1951 applies.110  This makes “under color of official right” a relative 
term that can be applied at any point of the election process that deals with the 
selection of a public official.  In United States v. Cerilli, the defendants 
attempted to combat the § 1951 claim against them by considering the payments 
to be political contributions, and therefore valid under the First Amendment.111  
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The court held that “the coercive solicitation of political contributions is within 
the realm of actions that are illegal under [§ 1951].”112 
C.  Intent 
Because both civil and criminal charges can be brought under § 1951, intent 
becomes an issue.  Some criminal charges require specific intent, while others 
have no intent requirement.  When considering intent, the court in United States 
v. Furey stated that “[§] 1951 is only a general intent statute, not a specific intent 
type of statute.  A general criminal intent is required, however.”113  The court 
further stated that a general intent to obtain property must be present, but a 
specific intent to affect commerce is not required.114  
VII.  RACKETEERING UNDER THE RICO ACT 
Just as the elements of racketeering are explicitly defined under Title 18 
U.S.C. § 1951, the elements for a pattern of racketeering are stated under Title 
18 U.S.C. § 1962, which is the RICO Act.  It states: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income 
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . 
. . in which such person has participated as a principal within the 
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, 
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of 
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or 
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. . . . 
 
(b)  It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of 
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
(c)  It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern 
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
 
(d)  It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of 
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.115 
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In order to understand how the statutory language of § 1951 fits in under the 
language of the RICO Act, § 1961 must be referenced.  Section 1961 explicitly 
defines some of the key phrases used in the RICO Act.  Section 1961 states: 
 
1. “racketeering activity” means . . . any act which is indictable 
under . . . section 1951 (relating to interference with 
commerce, robbery, or extortion.) . . . 
 
2. “person” includes any individual or entity capable of holding 
a legal or beneficial interest in property; 
 
3. “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity; 
 
4. “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective 
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten 
years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering 
activity.116 
 
Essentially, any series of racketeering actions can be used to form “racketeering 
activity” under this statute.  In plain language, if someone obtains property 
through extortion that affects interstate commerce and uses this money to 
establish or operate an enterprise, he is acting in violation of section (a).  
Multiple racketeering actions that take place within ten years create a “pattern of 
racketeering activity.”117  
VIII.  USING RACKETEERING LAW TO FIND AND PUNISH POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
Political corruption is not something that can easily be defined.  An act 
considered completely corrupt by a voter may fall within the regular course of 
business for a public official.118  Corrupt acts can be broken down and 
“partitioned into the ‘public official’ involved, the actual ‘favor’ provided by the 
public official, the ‘payoff’ gained by the public official, and the ‘donor’ of the 
payoff and/or ‘recipient’ of the ‘favor’ act.”119  A study120 has shown that a 
situation in which a legislator accepted a large campaign contribution in return 
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for voting a certain way on a bill would be considered corrupt by a majority of 
people.121  The fact that “the payoff is very direct and immediate”122 leads to a 
higher level of corruption, which seems to be generally accepted.  It is probable 
that “if a campaign contribution were not involved, almost all [of the senators, 
rather than just most] would have seen the act as corrupt.”123   
Now that racketeering law under the RICO Act has been clarified, it can 
effectively be applied to the new donation rules of Citizens United.  The major 
holding of that case, as previously stated, is that the statute banning independent 
corporate expenditures to political campaigns was a ban on speech and was 
unconstitutional.124  The possibility of unlimited corporate expenditures may 
change the way politicians run their campaigns. 
A recent study125 has shown that candidates who gain large pools of money 
through donations have a statistically better chance at winning public office.126  
There have been findings that state “the higher the percentage of donations a 
candidate accepts from PACs [political action committees],127 the more likely 
they are to win.”128  Another study states that “it seems that effects are strongest 
when more money is spent.”129  This has been viewed as a problem, especially 
when corporations are spending independently; this is the exact sort of spending 
that the majority opinion of Citizens United endorses.  It has been found that 
“independent spending is seen as a problem that campaign reformers must 
correct.  Independent expenditures represent special interests’ uncontrolled 
influence over both legislators and elections.”130  These findings are not 
shocking—more money can be used to convey more complete information to 
the public.  It allows for more presence in the media and a more extensive and 
active role on the political trail, leading to more voter contact by the candidate.   
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Media coverage and campaign contact with the voters are two of the main 
factors that can affect changes in the electoral system.131  Having corporate 
money to accomplish these things during a candidate’s campaign will give that 
candidate an advantage to control voter turnout.  The media can be used to either 
positively or negatively charge the political atmosphere of a campaign; “quality 
news coverage may mobilize [the voter] while sensationalist tabloid television 
may turn off the electorate.”132  Extensive contact with the voting population on 
the campaign trail, on the other hand, will usually always have positive effects.  
“[W]hen parties and candidates make personal contact with voters, it is assumed 
to have a positive influence.”133  A candidate’s access to extra funds to structure 
his campaign will allow him to construct attack ads that might demobilize the 
opposing parties’ voters, while adding the maximum amount of cities to his 
campaign trail to mobilize his own voters.  Now that candidates will be able to 
obtain all of these things through money from corporations, they may begin 
structuring their platforms around issues that are most important to businesses. 
The Citizens United case deals directly with media coverage during an 
election.  The judges of the dissenting opinion believe that corporations will 
eventually take over the media coverage of elections.  They state: 
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to and 
contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere; 
and if broadcast advertisements had no special ability to influence 
elections apart from the merits of their arguments (to the extent they 
make any); and if legislators always operated with nothing less than 
perfect virtue; then I suppose the majority’s premise would be sound.  
In the real world, we have seen corporate domination of the airwaves 
prior to an election may decrease the average listener’s exposure to 
relevant viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens’ willingness and 
capacity to participate in the democratic process.134 
This language shows that, following the majority’s decision, there was a 
legitimate fear that corporate finance toward election media would damage the 
election process by affecting the voters’ thoughts, behavior, and likelihood to 
vote.  
A.  Meeting the Racketeering Elements 
In the current struggling economy, proposed legislation on corporate tax 
cuts, the addition or limitation of restrictions upon factory regulations, or 
provisions on employee healthcare can stifle or lengthen the life of a 
corporation.  If a corporation has a questionable future, and the chances of it 
flourishing are dependent upon a candidate’s proposed legislation, the directors 
may decide that donations in furtherance of that candidate’s campaign will be in 
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the company’s best interest.  It is situations like these where we could likely find 
potential racketeering actions. 
To constitute the specific action of racketeering, the actions will only have to 
fulfill § 1951.  To constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the RICO 
Act, the actions will have to fulfill both the elements of §§ 1951 and 1962. 
Under § 1951, the candidate must affect or delay commerce through 
extortion,135 so the target company that he is seeking contributions from must be 
involved in interstate commerce.  If the candidate is able to obtain funds from a 
corporation involved in interstate commerce, then commerce is affected under 
the holding of Gates.136  Because the affect on commerce can be judged under a 
“de minimus” standard,137 a very minimal action can fulfill this element of the 
racketeering statute.  Even if no actual affect on the business can be found, the 
element can still be fulfilled if the court uses the “realistic probability” 
standard138 
When analyzing the extortion element, the question of whether the candidate 
will be subject to the “under color of official right” standard first needs to be 
answered.  Under the holding of Meyers, this standard can be applied if the 
candidate accepts the money while he or she is a candidate and keeps the money 
after taking the position of public office.139  It was also held, in Salvitti, that the 
actor must not have actually possessed the power to carry out the actions, but 
that the victim reasonably believed he had such power.140  If the candidate is an 
incumbent with a strong presence, the parties donating may reasonably believe 
that he will hold office for another term.  If the “under color of official right” 
standard is applicable, no evidence of force, violence or fear is required to prove 
extortion.141   
If the court decides that the “under color of official right” standard is not 
applicable to the candidate, there may be another way to fulfill the extortion 
element.  Under the holding of Sturman, fear of economic harm is an acceptable 
form of fear to sustain extortion.142  If the only reason the corporate directors 
donated to the candidate was in furtherance of proposed legislation that would 
save their business, then the extortion element can be fulfilled.   
The government may still have a case against a candidate if he loses the 
election.  The court in United States v. Tropiano held that attempted extortion 
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that would affect interstate commerce is enough to violate § 1951.143  Even if the 
candidate used his potential power to introduce proposed legislation to gain 
contributions and he never took office, his actions can still be held as 
racketeering. 
In order to sustain a claim under the RICO Act, the candidate has to have 
committed two or more racketeering acts within the course of ten years of each 
other, and he has to invest the money obtained in the establishment or operation 
of his campaign.144  Accepting two or more corporate contributions to be used in 
furtherance of his campaign within ten years of each other will constitute a 
violation of the RICO Act, then becoming organized crime.145 
These actions can create corruption or the appearance of corruption, which 
was exactly what the Federal Election Campaign Act was designed to prevent.  
The new rule that came from the holding of Citizens United can dismantle the 
integrity of our election system, which the government has been taking action to 
protect since 1907. 
IX.  PROTECTING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: THE DISSENTING OPINION OF 
CITIZENS UNITED 
In order to prevent racketeering activity from becoming a possibility, the 
rule from Citizens United that allows corporations to make unlimited 
independent expenditures to campaigns must be changed.  The dissenting 
opinion of this case, written by Justice Stevens, suggests that the majority 
created this rule to dissolve irrelevant issues.  He also proposes alternative 
holdings the majority could have applied that will not have the same ill effects 
of the sweeping constitutional change that was actually applied to decide the 
case. 
A.  The Constitutional Arguments 
Justice Stevens suggests that the main issue in this case was “whether 
Citizens United had a right[ . . . ] to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period 
[before elections].”146  This should not have turned into an argument over First 
Amendment speech, because Citizens United was permitted to take part in 
electioneering communication under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.147  
Not only was the majority’s First Amendment ruling unnecessary, it was also 
wrongly decided.  The First Amendment protects the free speech of citizens; 
“[a]lthough [corporations] make enormous contributions to our society, [they] 
are not actually members of it.”148 
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While the majority opinion stresses the importance of extending the free 
speech elements of the First Amendment to corporations, it neglects to analyze 
how this will impede upon the speech rights of the shareholders of that 
company.  “When corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a 
particular candidate for office, it is the shareholders, as the residual claimants, 
who are effectively footing the bill.”149  The shareholders are citizens whom the 
First Amendment rights were undoubtedly designed to protect—one class’s 
rights should not be hindered to serve the rights of another class.  The rule prior 
to Citizens United allowed corporations to fund independent expenditures 
through segregated funds that would not interfere with the rights of the 
shareholders.150  If a shareholder disagrees with the spending of a corporation’s 
general treasury fund, the remedies available to them, like derivative litigation, 
are long, expensive processes.151  Their only other option is to sell their stock.152  
This solution also may not be completely fair to the shareholder; “the injury to 
the shareholders’ expressive rights has already occurred; they might have 
preferred to keep that corporation’s stock in their portfolio for any number of 
economic reasons; and they may incur a capital gains tax or other penalty from 
selling their shares, changing their pension plan, or the like.”153    
Citizens United’s original claim included a facial constitutional challenge, 
but this claim was “expressly abandoned” in its summary judgment motion.154  
Citizens United changed its claim to an “as applied” challenge.155  The plaintiffs 
never asked the Court to reconsider the holding of Austin, so the majority’s 
decision to explicitly overturn the Austin rule and change the standard may have 
been completely outside the scope of the case.156  In the dissenting opinion, 
Justice Stevens states that “[e]ssentially, five justices were unhappy with the 
limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves 
an opportunity to change the law.”157 
The courts generally disfavor facial challenges.158  The facial challenge that 
was applied in Citizens United by the majority was also decided upon pure 
speculation.159  The dissenting opinion states that if Citizens United had decided 
to raise a facial challenge, “the parties could have developed, through the 
normal process of litigation, a record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual 
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burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and unions.”160  
Facial challenges made based purely on speculation are obviously not as strong 
as those that can be backed up by actual evidence.  Claims based on speculation 
“raise the risk of premature interpretation of statutes.”161  The dissenting opinion 
also states that while electioneering communication is a newer issue brought in 
by modern technology, it is not unique enough to require a facial challenge.162  
Justice Stevens states that “the fact that a Court can hypothesize situations in 
which a statute might, at some point down the line, pose some unforeseen as-
applied problems, does not come close to meeting the standard for a facial 
challenge.”163  The majority also states that it must use this case to make a facial 
challenge, because if they continued to decide as applied challenges “that 
process would itself run afoul of the First Amendment.”164  The Court today 
cannot be responsible for future judicial error—it cannot decide an issue that is 
not presently at hand to protect future decisions.165  The majority’s last argument 
for making a facial challenge is that the plaintiffs’ “dismissal of the facial 
challenge does not prevent [the court] ‘from making broader pronouncements of 
invalidity in properly “as applied” cases.’”166  While the analysis of this portion 
of the cited law review article is correct, the majority neglected to state that this 
Court used the same law review article for the exact opposite point in a previous 
case.167  For all of the above reasons, the majority’s facial challenge that sparked 
the extension of First Amendment rights to corporations was unnecessary. 
B.  Alternative Rulings 
Had the majority decided this case upon narrower grounds, which would 
have been more appropriate, three alternate holdings could have been 
considered.  First, the majority could have held that the movie that Citizens 
United was attempting to distribute did not qualify as “electioneering 
communication,” therefore, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act would not 
apply.168  Because the movie was being distributed through a video-on-demand 
program, and this type of technology was not main stream at the time the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was written, the Court could have made the 
argument that this was not the type of communication the Act was meant to 
regulate, and would have had the power to create a new standard for it.169  
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Second, the majority could have expanded the rule for non-profit corporations to 
cover those that accept only a “de minimis amount of money from for-profit 
corporations.”170  Citizens United is a corporation like this and is funded mostly 
through donations.  Third, the majority could have just decided the case upon 
the “as applied” challenge that Citizens United claimed, rather than upon a facial 
challenge that they created.171  Justice Stevens states that the majority “could 
have easily limited the breadth of its constitutional holding had it declined to 
adopt the novel notion that speakers and speech acts must always be treated 
identically—and always spared expenditure restrictions—in the political 
realm.”172 
C.  Stare Decisis 
The majority opinion is also faulty because it violates the principle of stare 
decisis.173  The dissenting judges argue that there was no reason for the Austin 
standard to be overturned.  A case should only be overturned if the holding was 
“dead wrong in its reasoning or irreconcilable with the rest of our doctrine.”174  
The majority opinion states that relying on Austin’s ruling would “diminish the 
principle of adhering to that precedent.”175  This argument is never further 
developed, and the majority opinion never explains why this holding is 
inconsistent with stare decisis.  In overturning Austin, the Court also never 
addressed the holding of McConnell.176  This case used Austin’s rationale—if the 
Austin rule was overturned, McConnell should have been overturned 
simultaneously.177 
One of the main reasons that the majority chose to overrule the Austin 
standard was because it created a ban on corporate political speech.178  This is 
incorrect—the statute upheld in Austin did “not impose an absolute ban on all 
forms of corporate political spending.”179  The statutes at issue in both Austin 
and McConnell allow corporations to spend for political purposes from 
segregated funds.180  Shareholders also have unlimited spending power if they 
act outside the corporate form.181  The only type of corporate speech that was 
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limited when Citizens United brought this action must fulfill all of the following 
elements:  
(1) broadcast, cable, or satellite communications; (2) capable of 
reaching at least 50,000 persons in the relevant electorate; (3) made 
within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general federal election; 
(4) by a labor union or non-MCFL, nonmedia corporation; (5) paid 
for with general treasury funds; (6) susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.182   
If the conduct in questions fails to meet even one of these elements, the speech 
is protected and cannot be regulated.  These regulations on corporate 
communication are far from a complete ban on corporate speech. 
After overturning the Austin rule, the majority’s next argument is based upon 
the corporate identity.  It held that “the Government cannot restrict political 
speech based on the speaker’s [. . .] identity.”183  This holding by the majority is 
inconsistent with many previous cases in which the Court restricted speech 
based upon the speaker’s identity.184 In the past, the Court also created rules that 
directly regulate political expression.185  These previous holdings make it 
reasonable for the Federal Election Campaign Act to regulate corporate speech 
without violating the First Amendment.  
D.  Potential Racketeering 
Some of the reasoning in the dissenting opinion uses language that alludes to 
the possibility of racketeering in the future.  When discussing the importance of 
the prevention of corruption, Justice Stevens states, “the difference between 
selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.  And selling 
access is not qualitatively different from giving special preference to those who 
spent money on one’s behalf.”186  This “special preference” he speaks of can 
come in many forms, but any form of reward in exchange for political spending 
can escalate into the solicitation of contributions through the extortionate 
measures discussed in Sections VI and VII.  The dissenting judges also discuss 
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the fluid nature of corruption, and how it may manifest in forms other than an 
action of plain bribery.187  The Court further states that:  
the influx of unlimited corporate money into the electoral realm also 
creates new opportunities for the mirror image of quid pro quo deals: 
threats, both explicit and implicit.  Starting today, corporations with 
large war chests to deploy on electioneering may find democratically 
elected bodies becoming much more attuned to their interests.188  
This is exactly the sort of behavior that would increase the likelihood of 
racketeering conduct.  The construction of legislation that is motivated by 
corporate dollars takes the focus of the government away from the citizens and 
turns it into a competition to please the wealthiest companies.  Our political 
parties will become engaged in a legislative arms race designed to pump out as 
much favorable corporate legislation as possible.    
The resulting effects on our election system that the dissenting opinion 
predicts are consistent with those that would flow from racketeering actions by 
candidates.  The dissenting judges state that “the opinions of real people may be 
marginalized” and “they may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to influence 
public policy.”189  This language coupled with the possibility of racketeering 
conduct indicate that, at the time of the Citizens United decision, the danger of 
racketeering was a potential problem that may adversely affect our election 
system.  By negatively changing the opinion of the voters on the election 
system, their active participation in the elections will be chilled, which could 
eventually mean less action at the polls than ever before. 
X.  POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
In order to combat the corruption created by the majority opinion of Citizens 
United, Congress can create stronger legislation on corporate spending.  Other 
than a complete reversal of the Citizens United decision, this is the only thing 
that can help maintain electoral integrity.  The Center for American Progress 
offers multiple congressional solutions to contain the current spending dilemma 
created by Citizens United.190 
First, Congress can create further legislation to require disclosure statements 
on political advertising by corporations.191  Currently, corporations are able to 
funnel their spending through other organizations that are not required to 
disclose their donors.  If Congress creates legislation that will require disclosure, 
all corporate spending for elections will become public information.  This will 
inform shareholders and consumers of where their money is being spent, while 
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informing voters of the political views of corporations.192  Requiring disclosure 
may affect a corporation’s business; negative affects from the shareholders and 
consumers that disagree with a corporation’s view may deter them from making 
large expenditures.   
Congress can also make an effort to define and regulate coordinated 
spending.193  The Citizens United ruling allows independent expenditures, but is 
silent on the subject of coordinated spending.  Coordinated spending will allow 
the candidate to be involved with deciding how the contribution money is 
spent.194  Putting further separation between the candidate and the corporation 
may directly prevent the potential racketeering conduct, because it will decrease 
the amount of pressure a candidate can put on a business by limiting the 
interaction between them.  Making sure that political candidates and corporate 
spenders do not work together in constructing a campaign will reduce overall 
corruption. 
Corporations can also be further regulated if they have an international 
status.195  If a corporation is international rather than domestic, there is a 
possibility that foreign money can be used to finance the contributions.196  The 
main holding of Citizens United rests upon the idea that First Amendment 
political speech rights should be extended to include corporations.  While this is 
obviously a debatable decision in itself, there is little argument for extending 
First Amendment political speech rights to foreign nationals.  By restricting 
corporations’ spending to only domestic money, the amount a corporation can 
possibly donate will decrease, leaving less of a chance of potential future 
racketeering actions.  If the corporation has less money to draw from, the 
candidates may be less inclined to structure a campaign favorable to the 
corporation in exchange for endorsement. 
Enacting a shareholder protection plan will also decrease the amount of 
money a corporation has for donating to candidates.197  If corporations offered 
the shareholders (the ultimate owners of the company) a choice between 
donating funds to support a specific candidate or party, and receiving a personal 
dividend, the shareholders rights will be protected.198  This will also give the 
shareholder an option other than completely divesting in the company if he or 
she disagrees with the views of the board of the corporation.199  If Congress 
enacts a plan like this one, the First Amendment rights of all parties involved 
will be protected, and the potential funding for political contributions will be 
lower, which will in turn lower the chances of corruption. 
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The last, and probably most effective, move Congress can make to reduce 
corruption is to pass the Fair Elections Now Act.200  The Fair Elections Now Act 
is an act that will give candidates the choice to run their campaign without 
accepting any large corporate donations.201  The passing of this act will 
completely eliminate the possibility of racketeering conduct.  Under this bill, 
candidates will fund their own campaigns through small, local contributions.202  
Candidates will also receive Fair Elections funding if they are able to collect a 
qualifying number of smaller contributions.203  After meeting the qualifying 
number of contributions to receive funding, the candidates can continue to 
receive small contributions that will be matched by the Fair Elections Fund.204  
Candidates that participate in the plan under the Fair Elections Now Act will 
also have an advantage by being granted lower campaign costs.205  If this Act is 
passed, the candidates who chose to cooperate with its plan will be running in a 
fairer and significantly less corrupt election.  Choosing to be funded through a 
combination of smaller, local contributions and government dollars will mean 
that candidates will no longer be dependent upon expenditures from 
corporations; their main concern will be constructing a platform that will 
positively affect the voters. 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
Racketeering law and election restrictions are two areas of law that are not 
typically connected.  Previous to the landmark decision in Citizens United, the 
chances of finding racketeering within election law were probably very slim. 
The corruption created by this new ruling is a fear that the government has 
been trying to combat for over a century.206  Not only will the effects of this new 
rule increase the appearance of corruption, this corruption may rise to a criminal 
level if racketeering action actually takes place.  The ever-changing and 
expanding definition of racketeering under the Racketeering Influenced and 
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Corrupt Organizations Act shows us that including political activity in its list of 
offenses is not a far stretch—it is already actively being applied to many 
situations that were not intended in its passing.  The immediate effects of this 
rule have already been seen in the political spending in the November 2010 
midterm elections; these sorts of changes will likely take place in the next 
presidential election in 2012, but on a larger scale. 
This corruption must be remedied.  Until there is another situation 
controversial enough to reach the Supreme Court level, the decision in Citizens 
United cannot be overruled.  Until then, it is imperative that Congress take 
measures to limit the amount of corruption that takes place in campaigns by 
putting as many restrictions as possible on expenditures by corporations.  If no 
remedial measures are taken to counteract the majority opinion of Citizens 
United, the influx of donations and contributions into government elections will 
affect voter behavior and may change the outcomes, which will change the 
internal structure of the government.  These changes by Congress must take 
place quickly, as members of Congress are also elected in public bipartisan 
elections.  After reviewing the amount of changes that took place in the 
November 2010 midterm elections, we can see that this corruption trickles to 
every level of the government, meaning that if corruption by the new 
contribution rules has already reached a congressional level, the chance to 
regulate the problem through legislation may be too late. 
The duty to regulate this rule can and should be left up to Congress.  The 
dissenting opinion of Citizens United states a long held belief by the courts: “to 
say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . 
. . an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny 
to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.”207  The potential 
invasion of organized crime into the election system is only one danger that can 
result from the controversial holding in Citizens United.  This rule creates an 
ultimate need for us to exercise the self-restraint written into the foundation of 
our Constitution.  Short of a complete reversal of Citizens United, congressional 
action is the only thing that can preserve the election system that was intended 
to construct the core powers of the United States government. 
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